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We propose a theory of asset prices that emphasizes heterogeneous information as the main
element determining prices of dierent securities. Our main analytical innovation is in formu-
lating a model of noisy information aggregation through asset prices, which is parsimonious and
tractable, yet exible in the specication of cash ow risks. We show that the noisy aggregation
of heterogeneous investor beliefs drives a systematic wedge between the impact of fundamentals
on an asset price, and the corresponding impact on cash ow expectations. The key intuition
behind the wedge is that the identity of the marginal trader has to shift for dierent realization
of the underlying shocks to satisfy the market-clearing condition. This identity shift amplies
the impact of price on the marginal trader's expectations. We derive tight characterization for
both the conditional and the unconditional expected wedges. Our rst main theorem shows how
the sign of the expected wedge (that is, the dierence between the expected price and the divi-
dends) depends on the shape of the dividend payo function and on the degree of informational
frictions. Our second main theorem provides conditions under which the variability of prices
exceeds the variability for realized dividends. We conclude with two applications of our theory.
First, we highlight how heterogeneous information can lead to systematic departures from the
Modigliani-Miller theorem. Second, in a dynamic extension of our model we provide conditions
under which bubbles arise.
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1 Introduction
Dispersed investor information, and disagreement among investors about the expected cash-ows
of dierent securities is a common feature of many, if not most nancial markets. In this paper, we
develop a parsimonious, exible model of asset pricing in which heterogeneity of information and its
aggregation in the market emerges as the core force determining asset prices and expected returns.
Our model is tractable for a rather general specication of the asset's underlying cash-ows, and
it delivers novel insights and sharp predictions that link the asset's predicted prices and returns to
features of the market environment and the distribution of the underlying cash-ow risk. We further
show that heterogeneous information provides a natural source of excess price volatility. Finally,
our model can easily be adapted to address a variety of questions. Using our model, we reconsider
two classical results in a heterogeneous information setting: the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, and
the sustainability of bubbles in a dynamic environment.
Specically, we consider an asset market along the lines of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig
(1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).1 An investor pool is divided into informed traders
who have observed a noisy signal about the value of an underlying cash ow, and uninformed
noise traders. The traders all submit orders to buy shares in the cash ow at the going price.
The price serves as a noisy signal of the state, which traders use along with their private signals
to form an update about the cash ows. Using the market structure rst introduced in Hellwig,
Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006), we assume that traders are risk neutral but face limits on their
asset positions. This enables us to derive a closed-form characterization for prices and expected
dividends conditional on the price, with no restriction on cash ows other than monotonicity in the
underlying fundamental shocks.
In our model, the asset price is equal to the expectation of cash ows for a \marginal investor"
who is just indierent between investing and not investing in the asset. We compare the marginal
investor's posterior belief to the belief of an objective outsider, who uses the observation of the
price to update beliefs about dividends, or equivalently an \econometrician" who uses a sample of
price-dividend observations to estimate this relationship. Compared to the outsider, the marginal
trader treats the information contained in the price as if he over-estimated its information content.
His posterior expectations thus attach a higher weight to the market signal and a lower residual
uncertainty to the fundamental than would be justied by its true information content. We label
this discrepancy the \information aggregation wedge".
1See Brunnermeier (2001), Vives (2008), and Veldkamp (2011) for textbook discussions.
1Despite its appearance, the information aggregation wedge is not the result of non-Bayesian
updating or irrational trading decisions. Instead, it results from compositional shifts under investor
heterogeneity: to maintain market-clearing, the identity of the marginal trader has to change
with the observed price in a way that amplies the impact of the price on the marginal trader's
expectations. For example, consider either an increase in the informed traders' demand coming from
a more favorable realization of the fundamentals (and hence their aggregate signal distribution),
or an increase in the noise traders' demand. These shifts both result in a higher price and a
higher expectation of future dividends, because of the information conveyed through the price.
In addition, since the demand by informed traders has become larger (or the pool of available
securities smaller), the marginal investor's private signal has to become more optimistic just to
maintain market-clearing. This further increases the price, but not expected dividends, over and
above the direct signal eect. The asset price thus appears to respond more to the market signal
than would be justied on the basis of its true information content.
From an ex ante perspective, we characterize the average price and dividends in closed form
as a function of the cash ow distribution and a parameter that summarizes the severity of the
informational friction. This information friction parameter depends on the accuracy of informed
traders' private signals, and the variance of noise trading shocks. Intuitively, the unconditional
wedge is the expected value of a mean-preserving spread of the underlying distribution of the
payos, i.e. from an ex ante perspective the market puts a higher weight on the tails than the
objective distribution. Moreover, the unconditional wedge has increasing dierences between the
informational noise parameter, and the asymmetry between upside and downside risks, where the
latter is dened as a partial order on payo risks that compares the marginal gains and losses at
xed distances from the prior mean of the fundamental.
From this characterization, Theorem 1 then provides several general implications for expected
returns. Regardless of the informational parameters, the unconditional wedge is zero when payo
risk is symmetric. The wedge is positive (meaning that the expected price exceeds expected divi-
dends) for risks that are dominated by the upside, and negative for risks that are dominated by the
downside. Moreover, in absolute value this wedge becomes more pronounced for more asymmetric
payo risks, or for a higher degree of information aggregation frictions. Our model thus oers
sharp, novel predictions that link the occurrence, size and direction of price premia and discounts,
both unconditionally and conditionally on the realization of shocks, to specic characteristic of the
market and the underlying cash-ow risk.
Theorem 2 characterizes the variability of prices relative to expected and realized dividends. We
2show that prices are always more variable than expected dividends. If the information aggregation
wedge is suciently important, prices may even be more variable than realized dividends. In the
limiting cases, the variability of prices exceeds that of realized dividend by any arbitrarily large
factor. Moreover, the correlation between price and realized dividends may be arbitrarily close to
zero. This stands in sharp contrast with the standard result in the asset pricing literature that price
volatility coming from dividend expectations is bounded above by the volatility of realized dividends
(as in West, 1988). Since dividend volatility in the data falls short in explaining variability of prices
(LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Shiller, 1981), the consensus explanation stresses variation in stochastic
discount rates (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Cochrane, 1992). Our theory instead suggests that high
price volatility could result from volatile market expectations about dividends in a fully rational
environment despite low variability in observed dividends, as long as the informational frictions are
strong enough.
We consider two applications of our theory. The rst revisits the Modigliani-Miller Theorem,
which establishes that under conditions of no arbitrage the total market value of any given cash ow
is not inuenced by how it is divided into separate securities. Absent distortions inside the rm,
the optimal capital structure is indeterminate and disconnected from the rm's market valuation
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Capital structure theories then focus mostly on trade-os that
aect the generation of cash ows inside the rm, such as agency costs, information frictions or tax
distortions, assuming that the market value of the resulting cash ow is not aected by its split
into dierent securities. Here instead we take the view that capital structure and rm value may
also be inuenced by heterogeneous information and nancial market frictions.
We consider a seller who is splitting a given cash ow into two pieces which are sold to separate
investor pools in two dierent markets, and suppose that at least one of the pieces is dominated
either by upside or by downside risk. We show that the expected revenue of the seller is not
aected by the split, if and only if the two markets are characterized by identical informational
characteristics. However, when the investor pools dier, the seller can manipulate her expected
revenue by selling downside risks in the market with smaller information aggregation frictions,
and upside risks in the market with larger information aggregation frictions. The seller maximizes
expected revenue by completely separating upside and downside risks, splitting the cash ow into
a debt claim for the downside, and an equity claim for the upside, with a default point for debt at
the prior median.
Second, we consider the sustainability of rational bubbles. A well-known result shows that the
absence of arbitrage eliminates the possibility of persistent over-pricing of securities (Tirole, 1982;
3Santos and Woodford, 1997). While the anticipation of higher future prices would, in principle,
induce agents to increase the price bid in the current period, the combination of no arbitrage with
transversality conditions (or backwards induction, in case of assets with nite horizons) rules out
the possibility of any security trading at a price that exceeds the net present value of expected
future cash ows.
We consider a simple, innitely repeated version of our trading model with constant discounting,
and give conditions under which a security may be permanently over- or under-priced, regardless
of current market conditions. As usual, we can break down the current price, expected dividends
and wedge into a component resulting from expectations about current cash-ows, and a com-
ponent resulting from expected discounted future cash-ows and prices. The former inherits the
same properties as the static conditional information aggregation wedge, while the latter inherits
the properties of the unconditional wedge. If the cash-ow has a bounded downside risk and is
dominated by the upside, and traders are suciently patient, then the positive expected future
wedge more than osets any negative current wedge. The asset then trades at a premium over its
expected dividend value regardless of the current state realization. The ipside of these conditions
shows that securities that have bounded upside and are dominated by the downside risk may be
permanently underpriced.
Finally, we discuss the theoretical robustness of the information aggregation wedge. First, we
generalize distributional assumptions for fundamentals and signals, and by considering arbitrary
bounds on the portfolio holdings. Second, we also extend the nancial market model to include
uninformed traders which partially arbitrage the wedge.
Our paper contributes to a large literature on noisy information aggregation in asset markets,
including the papers cited above. Much of this literature works within a canonical preference struc-
ture of CARA utility and normally distributed signals and dividends. Remarkably, the information
aggregation wedge appears to have received little attention in this literature, even though it is
present in these canonical models, and, as we show, is the source of rich implications for prices,
trading activities, and market volatility.2 By avoiding the restrictive functional form assumptions
on cash-ow distributions, we are able to provide a characterization of this wedge for a general
class of securities and draw implications that link average returns and return volatility to features
of the cash-ow distribution and the importance of information frictions.
Another inuential literature emphasizes heterogeneous beliefs and short sales constraints as
2The only written statement of this observation that we have found appears in Vives (2008), where it is only
mentioned in passing.
4potential sources of bubbles, mis-pricing, and market anomalies (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Allen,
Morris and Postlewaite, 1993; Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong
and Stein, 2007; Hong and Sraer, 2011). Mispricing is sustained by the option to resell an over-
valued security to an even more optimistic buyer in the future. This option becomes valuable
in the presence of (one-sided) short-sales constraints, and implies a channel for over-valuation.
Heterogeneity in prior beliefs is taken as exogenous, and with the exception of Allen, Morris and
Postlewaite (1993), traders do not update from the observation of prices. We touch on similar
themes, but stay within the REE tradition in which traders' beliefs result from exogenous signals,
and information aggregation through prices imposes tight restrictions on the heterogeneity in beliefs.
Furthermore, our limits to arbitrage are not explicitly asymmetric, give rise to over- as well as
under-valuation results, and our market environment is static, so the resale option doesn't play an
important role (except in the dynamic application to bubbles). The mechanism that gives rise to
mis-pricing and bubbles is therefore quite dierent.3
The literature on \over-condence" explores how asset prices and nancial markets are inu-
enced by the degree to which investors over-estimate the accuracy of their own information (e.g.
Odean, 1998, and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). When viewed from the perspec-
tive of a representative investor, the market price that emerges in our model is perfectly consistent
with these same over-condence biases, yet all investors are fully rational and not mistaken about
the quality of their signals. What may look like an over-condence bias in the aggregate can thus
be accounted for by heterogeneity and aggregation from the micro level.
More generally, any theory of mispricing must rely on some source of noise aecting the market,
coupled with some limits to the traders' ability to exploit the resulting arbitrage opportunity
(see Gromb and Vayanos, 2010, for an overview and numerous references). In our model, the
combination of noise trading and limits to arbitrage with heterogeneous information leads not just
to random errors in the price, but to systematic, predictable departures of the price from the
asset's fundamental value. The exact nature of our limits to arbitrage assumptions (embedded in
the position limits and the noise trading formulation) is not central for our results, but guarantees
the tractability of the updating, with virtually no assumptions imposed on cash-ows.
In section 2, we describe our model and provide the equilibrium characterization of asset prices.
3For example, the dierence between our work and theories of bubbles based on short-sales constraints becomes
clear if one considers the case of debt instruments, as in Hong and Sraer (2011). Whereas in their model, short-sales
constraints lead to over-valuation of debt, but with less volatility and trading volume than equity bubbles, our model
predicts that debt may naturally be under-priced.
5In section 3, we dene the information aggregation wedge and discuss at length the resulting
prediction for conditional and unconditional asset returns. Section 4 uses the insight oered by
these two results to revisit the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and the existence of bubbles in the
dynamic version of the model. Section 5 concludes the analysis with the robustness discussion.
2 Model
2.1 Agents, assets, information structure and nancial market
The market is set as a Bayesian trading game with a unit measure of risk-neutral, informed traders,
a stochastic measure of uninformed \noise traders", and a `Walrasian auctioneer'. There is a risky
asset whose supply is normalized to a unit measure, and whose dividend is a strictly increasing and
twice continuously dierentiable function () of a stochastic \fundamental" .
At the start, nature draws  according to a normal distribution with mean 0, and unconditional
variance 2
,  s N(0;2
). Each informed trader i then receives a noisy private signal xi which is
normally distributed with a mean  and a variance  1, and is i.i.d. across traders (conditional
on ), xi s N(; 1). Each trader decides whether to purchase up to one share of the asset at
the prevailing price P, in exchange for cash. Formally, trader i submits a price-contingent demand
schedule di() to maximize her expected wealth wi = di  (()   P). Traders cannot short-sell the
asset or buy additional shares, restricting demand to [0;1]. Individual trading strategies are then
a mapping d : R2 ! [0;1] from signal-price pairs (xi;P) into asset holdings. Aggregating traders'





(x   )); (1)
where () denotes a cumulative standard normal distribution, and (
p
(x   )) represents the
cross-sectional distribution of private signals xi conditional on the realization of .4 In addition,
there is stochastic demand for the asset from noise traders, which takes the form (u), where u
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2
u, u s N(0;2
u), independently of . This
specication is adapted from Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006), and allows us to preserve
the tractability of Bayesian updating with normal posterior beliefs.5
Once all traders have submitted their orders, the auctioneer selects a price P to clear the
market. Formally, the market-clearing price function P : R2 ! R selects P from the correspondence
4We assume that the Law of Large Numbers applies to the continuum of traders, so that conditional on  the
cross-sectional distribution of signal realizations ex post is the same as the ex ante distribution of traders' signals.
5We generalize this demand specication in Section 4.2 allowing for price-elastic demands by noise traders.
6^ P (;u) = fP 2 R : D(;P) + (u) = 1g, for all (;u) 2 R2.6 After all trades are completed, the
dividends () are realized and disbursed to the owners of the asset.
Let H(jx;P) : R ! [0;1] denote the traders' posterior cdf of , conditional on observing a
private signal x, and conditional on the market price P. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium con-
sists of demand functions d(x;P) for informed traders, a price function P(;u), and posterior
beliefs H(jx;P) such that (i) d(x;P) is optimal given H(jx;P); (ii) the asset market clears for
all (;u); and (iii) H(jx;P) satises Bayes' rule whenever applicable, i.e., for all p such that
f(;u) : P(;u) = pg is non-empty.
2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We begin by characterizing informed traders' demand. With risk-neutrality, the trader's expected
value of holding the asset is
R
()dH (jx;P). Since private signals are log-concave and ()
is increasing in , posterior beliefs H(jx;P) are rst-order stochastically increasing in x, and
R
()dH (jx;P) is strictly increasing in x, for any P that is observed in equilibrium (Milgrom,
1981). The traders' decisions are therefore characterized by a signal threshold function ^ x : R !
R[f1g, such that d(xi;P) = Ixi^ x(P), that is, the trader places an order to buy a share at price
P, if and only if xi  ^ x(P). We call the trader who observes the signal equal to the threshold,
x = ^ x(P), and who is therefore indierent, the marginal trader. The signal threshold is uniquely
dened by
^ x(P) = +1 if lim
x!+1
Z
()dH (jx;P)  P;
^ x(P) =  1 if lim
x! 1
Z
()dH (jx;P)  P;
P =
Z
()dH (j^ x(P);P) otherwise. (2)
Expression (2) illustrates three cases: (i) if the most optimistic trader's expected dividend is lower
than the price, no trader buys, so the signal threshold becomes +1; (ii) if the most pessimistic
trader's expected dividend exceeds the price, all traders buy, and the threshold for buying is
 1; (iii) only some traders buy, and the threshold ^ x(P) takes an interior value at which the
marginal trader's posterior expectation of the dividend must equal the price. Aggregating the
individual trading decisions, the informed demand is D(;P) =
R 1
^ x(P) 1  d(
p
 (x   )) = 1  
(
p
 (^ x(P)   )), which equals 0 if ^ x(P) = +1, and 1 if ^ x(P) =  1.
6We can without loss of generality restrict the range of P () to coincide with the range of  ().
7Next, we analyze the market-clearing condition. Since (u) 2 (0;1), in equilibrium, ^ x() must
be nite for all P on the equilibrium path, and satisfy the third condition in (2). From the market-
clearing condition, we then have (
p
 (^ x(P)   )) = (u), which allows us to characterize the
correspondence of market-clearing prices:
^ P (;u) =








From now on, we focus on equilibria in which the price is conditioned on (;u) through the
observable state variable z  +1=
p
 u. The next lemma characterizes the resulting equilibrium
beliefs. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Information Aggregation) (i) In any equilibrium with conditioning on z, the equi-
librium price function P(z) is invertible. (ii) Equilibrium beliefs for price realizations observed
along the equilibrium path are given by
H (jx;P) = 
 q
 2





u  ^ x(P)
 2




Part (ii) of the Lemma exploits the invertibility to arrive at a complete characterization of
posterior beliefs H(jx;P). With invertibility, we can summarize information conveyed by the price
through z. Conditional on , z is normally distributed with mean  and variance 2
u=. Thus, the
price is isomorphic to a normally distributed signal of , with a precision that is increasing in the
precision of private signals, and decreasing in the variance of demand shocks.


















This condition equates P to the marginal trader's expectation of dividends. The latter also
depends on P through its eect on posterior beliefs. Using the market-clearing condition ^ x(P) = z,
Proposition 1 uniquely characterizes the market equilibrium.7
Proposition 1 (Asset market equilibrium) For any increasing dividend function (), an as-
set market equilibrium exists, is unique, and is characterized by the price function P (z) and the
traders' threshold function ^ x(p) = z = P 1
 (p), where

















7Notice that this only implies the uniqueness of the equilibrium that conditions on the summary statistic z, not
overall uniqueness of the equilibrium characterized in proposition 1.
8The price function P(z) is uniquely dened and strictly monotone, and therefore denes the
unique market equilibrium.8
3 The Information Aggregation Wedge
3.1 Conditional Information aggregation wedge
We now discuss how noisy information aects equilibrium prices and expected dividend values.
To be precise, we form expectations of dividends from the perspective of an outside observer (or
\econometrician") who does not have access to any private signal about , but knows the parameters
of the game and observes the realization of the price P, or equivalently the state z. This outsider









u ) 1), and therefore has
an expectation of dividends conditional on public information z, denoted V(z):

















The main observation from comparing Proposition 1 with equation (7) is that at the interim
stage {when the share price is observed but before dividends are realized{ the equilibrium price
diers from the expected dividend, conditional on the public information. This dierence is due to
the impact of private information on equilibrium prices. We label this dierence the information
aggregation wedge, W(z)  P(z)   V(z).
The choice of V() as a natural benchmark of comparison for P() follows from the fact that
V() also corresponds to the expected dividend (or in a suciently large data set, to the average
dividend), conditional on the observation of P (recall that P() is invertible). This benchmark
diers from the one chosen e.g. by Harrison and Kreps (1978), who compare an asset's value to the
dividend expectation of any trader in their market, or to an average of those expectations, as in
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). Our formulation has the advantage that V() and P() both
have direct empirical counterparts in any set of price-return data, and this formulation therefore
allows us to directly focus on the empirical, testable implications of our model.
The price P(z), and the expected dividend conditional on public information, V(z), dier
in how expectations of  are formed. The price equals the dividend expectation of the marginal
trader who is indierent between keeping or selling her share. This trader conditions on the market
signal z, as well as a private signal whose realization must equal the threshold ^ x(P) in order to be
8We index an equilibrium function or variable by  to make explicit that it is derived from a specic dividend
function  (), i.e. P () is the equilibrium price function that is derived from dividend function  () by equation (6).
9consistent with the trader's indierence condition. The trader treats these two sources of informa-
tion as mutually independent signals of . At the same time, the market-clearing condition implies
that ^ x(P) must equal z in order to equate demand and supply of shares. The marginal trader's
expectation E(()jx = z;z) thus behaves as if she received one signal z of precision  +  2
u
instead of  2
u . In contrast, the expected dividends E(()jz) conditional on P (or equivalently
z) weighs z according to its true precision  2
u .
Figure 1: Marginal Trader Identity Shift
The dierence in the responsiveness of the price relative to the expected dividend conditional
in the price results from the compositional shift in the identity of the traders holding the shares.
This is depicted in gure 1. Any increase in z shifts the identity of the marginal trader's private
signal one-for-one. If  increases, the distribution of private signals shifts up, so for a given signal
threshold, demand for the asset by informed traders increases, but demand from uninformed traders
is unchanged. If instead s increases, uninformed demand increases, but informed demand remains
the same. In both cases, the asset is relatively scarcer for informed traders, so the threshold for
the informed trader's private signal has to increase in order to clear the market. In addition to this
compositional shift (which only appears in the expectation of the marginal trader, e.g. the price),
all traders, as well as the uninformed outsider, recognize that an increase in z, as revealed through
P shifts up their expectation of the state . This is reected in the weight  2
u attributed to z in
both P(z) and V(z).
Belief heterogeneity and limits to arbitrage are both necessary ingredients to obtain the wedge.
10If instead all informed traders have access to a common signal z of fundamentals, they all hold
identical expectations and must be indierent between buying and not buying to clear the market.
But this requires that the price equals the common expectation of the dividend, i.e. P (z) = V (z).
The same result applies with free entry of uninformed arbitrageurs (Kyle, 1985).
The remainder of this subsection describes properties of the wedge, conditional on z, which will





 +  +  2
u






as the response coecients of the expectations of  entering P() and V() to innovations in z.








(V z + 
p
1   V u)(u)du
This formulation summarizes the dierence between the price and the expected dividend by the
response parameters P and V , which measure the marginal trader's and outsider's update of  to
z. These parameter enter P() and V() in two ways: the marginal trader's expectation responds
more strongly to z, and his residual uncertainty about  (after observing z) is lower: 2
 (1   P)
instead of 2
 (1   V ). Using a third-order Taylor expansion, we approximate the wedge by





00(Pz)(1   P)   00(V z)(1   V )

: (8)
The term  (Pz)    (V z) captures the shift in expectations, while the second term in squared
brackets captures the role of residual uncertainty. The latter plays a role only if  () is non-linear,
and in that case matters through second- and higher derivatives. The shift in expectations from
V z to Pz amounts to a mean-preserving spread from an ex ante perspective, and is therefore a
source of increased variability in the price, relative to expected fundamentals:  (Pz)    (V z)
crosses 0 at a single point where z = 0, is negative when z < 0, and positive when z > 0.
When  () is linear, the higher sensitivity of expectations to z is the only eect determining the
wedge, while the residual uncertainty plays no role. Panel a) of gure 2 plots the price (solid line),
the expected dividend (dashed line) and conditional wedge (dashed-dotted line) as a function of
the state variable z, for () = . The price is more sensitive to innovations in z than the expected
dividend, resulting in a wedge W(z) = (P   V )z that is negative for z < 0, zero for z = 0, and
positive for z > 0.
11For non-linear dividends, residual uncertainty shifts the level of the wedge up or down, depending
on a comparison between the residual uncertainty levels 1   P relative to 1   V , and the second
derivatives 00(Pz) and 00(V z). At the prior mean z = 0, the second derivatives are comparable,
so the reduction of uncertainty implies a negative wedge if 00(0) > 0, and a positive wedge, if
00(0) < 0. Away from z = 0, the third- and higher derivatives may reduce or even overturn
this eect, and therefore make it impossible to oer precise results on the shape of W() without
additional restrictions. We illustrate these possibilities with two parametric examples that follow.
Figure 2: Conditional Price, Expected Dividend, and Wedge
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Example 1: Exponential dividend function
Suppose that  () = 1













W (z) = P (z)






In this case, the price and expected dividend are both exponential functions in z, with a stronger
reaction of prices to z. The residual uncertainty aects both V (z) and P (z) multiplicatively, but
the factor is larger for V (z), reecting the fact that residual uncertainty is greater for the outsider.
If k > 0, we then have a dividend function that is increasing, convex, and bounded below by
zero (gure 2, panel c). The wedge is negative at z = 0 and non-monotone. It decreases at rst,
reaches its lowest value at some intermediate point, and is increasing and convex from there on,
crossing 0 at z = k
22
 > 0. The reverse image obtains when k < 0, in which case  is increasing,
concave, and bounded above by zero (gure 2, panel d). For negative z, the wedge is negative at
rst and increasing in z, crossing 0 at z = k
2 2
 < 0. It reaches its maximum value at a negative
z and then monotonically converges towards 0. This example thus conrms the intuitions from
the shift in means which makes P (z) more responsive to a shift in z, and the shift in residual
uncertainty that is captured by the multiplicative factors. The curvature parameter k governs the
shape of the wedge function, and whether the residual uncertainty increases or decreases the wedge.
We use this example to illustrate our two main results. First, we show that the expected wedge
is positive if and only if k > 0, and negative if k < 0. That is, the security trades at a premium
in the case with convex dividends and upside risks, and at a discount in the case with concave
dividends and downside risks. Taking expectations, we have
E(V (z)) = 1=k  e
k2
2 2





















(P=V  1)P   1

,
which is positive whenever k > 0, and negative for k < 0 (and can be checked to approach 0
continuously as k ! 0).
Second, we show that the model exhibits excess price volatility. Focusing on log variances
for analytical convenience, we have: V ar(log ()) = k22
, V ar(logV (z)) = V k22
, and
V ar(logP (z)) = 2
P=V k22
. Therefore, we observe that V ar(logP (z)) > V ar(logV (z)), for
any parameter set. Moreover, if the information aggregation wedge becomes suciently important,
then we may have 2
P=V > 1, and therefore V ar(logP (z)) > V ar(log ()). In particular, this is
a result of the following two limiting scenarios: (i) if for given V < 1, P approaches 1, i.e. the in-
formed traders have very precise signals for given level of information in the price, or (ii) if V ! 0,
13while P is bounded away from 0. In this case, the market becomes very noisy, for a given level of
private information. On the other hand, V ar(logV (z)) is always less than V ar(log ()), which
is a direct application of Blackwell's Theorem on comparison of information structures (Blackwell,
1951, 1953).
Our main two theorems that follow generalize these observations about the unconditional wedge
and excess price volatility. Theorem 1 below establishes that the sign and magnitude of the average
wedge on the comparison of upside vs. downside risks. Theorem 2 generalizes the result that prices
are more variable than expected dividends, and in some cases even more variable than realized
dividends. Our second example, however, reinforces the observation that the conditional wedge
W() need not be monotone in general, and may also cross 0 at multiple points, which rules out
conditional or local versions of these results without imposing additional assumption on dividends.
Example 2: Cubic dividend function
Suppose that  () =  + a3, with a > 0 to ensure monotonicity of . For a cubic function
(gure 2, panel b), the above approximation holds exactly, so that
W(z) = (P   V )z + a(3
P   3
V )z3 + 3az2
 [P (1   P)   V (1   V )];
where the rst two terms correspond to the shift in means, and the last to the shift in residual
uncertainty. If P + V > 1 and a suciently large, W0
(0) < 0. Since W(0) = 0, it follows
immediately that W() is non-monotone and crosses 0 in three dierent locations.
3.2 Unconditional information aggregation wedge
To obtain general results, we focus on unconditional moments of prices and expected dividends.
Let W = E(W (z)) denote the expected information aggregation wedge associated with a payo
function (). The next lemma provides a characterization of W which forms the basis for the
subsequent comparative statics results.
Lemma 2 (Unconditional Wedge) Dene P as 2
P = 2
 (1 + (P=V   1)P). The uncondi-



















This characterization shows how the wedge depends separately on both the curvature the payo
function, and the parameters describing the informational environment. The parameter P > 
14corresponds to the prior variance of , as assessed by the marginal trader, and summarizes the
importance of informational frictions in the market. By taking ex ante expectations over z, the
shifts in mean and residual uncertainty combine into a mean-preserving spread between the weights
that the marginal trader and the outsider associate with each realizations of .
The marginal trader places more weight on the tails of the fundamental distribution, from an ex
ante perspective (i.e., P > ). This result can intuitively be understood as follows: the marginal
trader's posterior of , conditional on z, is normal with mean Pz and variance (1   P)2
. The
prior over z is normal with mean 0 and variance 2
=V . Compounding the two distributions, the





P. The outsider, on the other hand, holds the posterior that conditional
on z,  is normal with mean V z and variance (1   V )2
. His compounded distribution then




. Hence, the information frictions summarized by the distance of P from  will be large
whenever the market signal is noisy relative to private signals, or the ratio P=V is high, as this
leads to a large discrepancy between the posterior beliefs held by the marginal trader and the
outsider.
We use Lemma 2 to sign the unconditional wedge as a function of the shape of the dividend
function, and to oer comparative statics with respect to  and the informational parameters P
and V . Our next denition provides a partial order on payo functions that we will use for the
comparative statics.
Denition 1 (i) A dividend function  has symmetric risks if 0 () = 0 ( ) for all  > 0.
(ii) A payo function  is dominated by upside risks, if 0 ()  0 ( ) for all  > 0. A payo
function  is dominated by downside risks, if 0 ()  0 ( ) for all  > 0.
(iii) A dividend function 1 has more upside (less downside) risk than 2 if 0
1 ()   0
1 ( ) 
0
2 ()   0
2 ( ) for all  > 0.
This denition classies payo functions by comparing marginal gains and losses at xed dis-
tances from the prior mean to determine whether the payo exposes its owner to bigger payo
uctuations on the upside or the downside. Any linear dividend function has symmetric risks, any
convex function is dominated by upside risks, and any concave dividend function is dominated by
downside risks. The classication however also extends to non-linear functions with symmetric
gains and losses, as well as non-convex functions with upside risk or non-concave functions with
downside risk. Figure 3 plots examples of payo functions dominated by dierent types of risk.
15Figure 3: Dividend risk types
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The following Theorem summarizes the comparative statics implications that follow directly
from this partial order, and the characterization in lemma 2.
Theorem 1 (Average prices and returns) (i) Sign: If  has symmetric risk, then W = 0. If
 is dominated by upside risk, then W  0. If  is dominated by downside risk, then W  0.
(ii) Comparative Statics w.r.t. : For given 2
P, if 1 has more downside and less upside
risk than 2, then W2  W1.
(iii) Comparative Statics w.r.t. 2
P: If  is dominated by upside or downside risk, then
jWj is increasing in P. Moreover, limP! jWj = 0, and limP!1 jWj = 1, whenever there
exists " > 0, such that j0 ()   0 ( )j > " for all   ".
(iv) Increasing dierences: If 1 has more upside risk than 2, then W1 (P)   W2 (P)
is increasing in P.
This theorem summarizes how the shape of the dividend function and the informational param-
eters combine to determine the sign and magnitude of the unconditional information aggregation
wedge. It shows that unconditional price premia or discounts arise as a combination of two ele-
ments: upside or downside risks in the dividend prole , and an impact of private information on
market prices (P > V ). The latter requires that updating from prices is noisy (V < 1). This
Theorem forms the rst part of our core theoretical contribution, and shows that noisy informa-
tion aggregation may inuence conditional and unconditional returns of assets through their payo
16prole and the informational characteristics of the market.
The result is easily understood from our interpretation of the wedge as the expected value of a
symmetric, mean-preserving spread of the true underlying fundamental distribution.
Part (i) shows that the sign of the wedge is determined by whether  is dominated by upside,
downside, or symmetric risk. When the dividend function has symmetric risk, the gains from this
spread on the upside exactly cancel the expected losses on the downside, and the total eect is 0.
When the dividend is dominated by upside risks, the expected upside gains dominate and the value
of the mean-preserving spread is positive, leading to a positive unconditional wedge. Conversely,
when the dividend is dominated by downside risks, the expected losses on the downside dominate
and the expected value of the spread is negative.
Parts (ii), (iii), and (iv) complement the rst result on the possibility of price premia or
discounts with specic predictions on how its magnitude depends on cash ow and informational
characteristics.
Part (ii) shows that an asset with more upside or less downside risk on average has a higher
price premium or a lower price discount, all else equal. Thus, returns on average are lower (and
prices higher) for securities that represent more upside risks. Simply put, the mean-preserving
spread becomes more valuable when the payo function shifts towards more upside risk.
Part (iii) shows the role of informational parameters. For a given payo function, the uncon-
ditional wedge increases in absolute value as the information aggregation friction has bigger eects
(higher P). For a given set of upside or downside risks, a bigger mean-preserving spread generates
bigger gains or losses. Moreover, a wedge obtains only if P > V , i.e., if the heterogeneous beliefs
have an impact on price. The wedge is increasing in P and decreasing in V , as the precision of
market information and private information move the wedge in opposite directions. Under regular-
ity conditions, which ensure that the payo asymmetry doesn't disappear in the tails, the absolute
value of the wedge approaches innity when V ! 0. This obtains if for a given value of , the
market noise becomes innitely large. In this limiting case, the marginal trader remains responsive
to z, even though the z is innitely noisy.
Part (iv) shows that the unconditional wedge has increasing dierences between the dominance
of upside risk and the level of market noise. This implies that the eects of market noise and
asymmetry in dividend risk are mutually reinforcing on the magnitude of the wedge.
Importantly, our results on dierences between expected prices and dividends are not a conse-
quence of irrational trading strategies, behavioral biases of investors, or agency conicts. Nor are
such dierences accounted for by risk premia (since traders are risk neutral). Our model thus oers
17a theory in which average prices can dier systematically from expected dividends as a result of the
interplay between the dividend structure and the partial aggregation of information into prices, in
a context where traders hold heterogeneous beliefs in equilibrium and arbitrage is limited. To our
knowledge, this channel is new to the literature.
3.3 Excess Price Variability
Our second main result concerns the variability of prices, relative to expected dividends and realized
dividends. As can readily be seen from the above characterizations, if W0
 () > 0, the unconditional
variance of prices (prior to realization of z) exceeds the variability of expected dividends. Consider
furthermore the limiting case where P ! 1, in which P (z) !  (z). Since the variance of z
exceeds that of , it follows immediately that in this limit, where the informed traders' signals
become arbitrarily precise, the variability of prices can exceed the variability of dividends. This
result is illustrated in the linear and the log-normal examples discussed in section 3.1.
Our second theorem generalizes these observations. To do so, we will need to impose some re-
strictions to handle the non-linearities and higher-order eects that are confounding the comparative
statics of W with respect to z. Concretely, we will focus on risks that are symmetric or dominated
by the upside or downside, and we will focus on E
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( ()    (0))
2

as our criterion for the variability of prices, expected dividends, and realized
dividends, respectively, rather than the unconditional variances. The next theorem states our main
result concerning excess variability:
Theorem 2 (Excess variability of prices) For any payo function  () that is symmetric, dom-
inated by upside, or dominated by downside risk:
(i) The variability of expected dividends is always less than the variability of realized dividends
and the variability of prices:
E
















(P (z)   P (0))
2

(ii) The excess variability of prices relative to expected dividends is increasing in P and de-
creasing in V .
(iii) For any V , if P is suciently high, then the variability of prices exceeds the variability
of realized dividends. The same occurs if, for given P, V is suciently low.
(iv) If  () is unbounded on one side, then limV !0 E





18This theorem shows that the price is more variable than expected dividends, and if the market
is suciently noisy, even more variable than realized dividends. The latter occurs in the limiting
cases where supply shocks are unboundedly large (2
u ! 1, V ! 0), or the traders' private
information is innitely precise ( ! 1, P ! 1). In the former case, the variability of prices
can be arbitrarily large, even as the variability of realized and expected dividends is bounded. The
statement of the result relies on two restrictions which we used for analytical tractability. First,
the focus on a variability measure which combines a variance with a bias between the average price
and the price at the average fundamental. Second, we restrict ourselves to symmetric, upside or
downside risks. With these restrictions, the results are the cleanest, and easiest to interpret.
To understand this result, and the source of excess price variability in our model, it is use-
ful to think of a counter-factual third person who observes a signal z with distribution zj 
N(;( +  2
u ) 1). Like the uninformed outsider, this third person is fully Bayesian, but has ac-
cess to a more informative signal, whose precision matches that of the marginal traders'. Therefore
in comparison to the marginal trader, the third person will form the same posterior beliefs, condi-
tonal on a realization of z, but z will be drawn from a distribution with a lower ex ante variance,
and be consistent with Bayes' Rule derived from the objective signal precision. In comparison to
the uninformed outsider, the third person is also fully Bayesian, but with simply a more precise
signal. We break down the comparison between E

(P (z)   P (0))
2

and the other terms into
a comparison between E






(P (z)   P (0))




and the comparison of this latter term with the ex ante variability of expected and realized divi-
dends. E

(P (z)   P (0))
2 jz  N(;( +  2
u ) 1

corresponds to the counter-factual variability
of prices, if z had been drawn from a distribution zj  N(;( +  2
u ) 1), such that P (z) is
consistent with a posterior expectation of  conditional on z.
For the comparison of the counter-factual variability of prices with the variability in expected
and realized dividends, we rst proceed to break down the variability measures into a variance and a
bias term. The variance terms can then be compared using Blackwell's theorem on the comparison
of experiments (Blackwell, 1951, 1953). Since  (), P (z), and V (z) correspond to the posterior
expectation of  () for respectively, an agent who observes the true , the counter-factual signal
z, and the actual signal z, the unconditional variance of  exceeds the unconditional variance of
P under the distribution z  N(;( +  2
u ) 1), which exceeds the unconditional variance of V
under the distribution z  N(;2
u=). For symmetric, upside and downside risks, the bias terms
follow exactly the same ranking.9
9Our choice of variability measure (which is equivalent to the variance for symmetric risks) allows for the cleanest
19Therefore, if this second term was the only relevant component, the variability of prices in our
model would satisfy the standard conditions resulting from the Blackwell comparison of experiments
- namely, that a more informative price signal raises price volatility and expected dividend volatility,
but both are bounded by the volatility of realized dividends. At best, the volatility gap can be
brought close to zero when information in the market is suciently precise. For models in which
asset prices are always equal to expected future dividends, this observation is made precise by West
(1988).
The excess volatility then results from the rst term, which measures the over-reaction of the
price compared to its true information content. This term measures the dierence between the
variability in prices under the objective signal distribution z  N(;2
u=) with the variability in
prices (derived from the same price function) for a counter-factual signal distribution z  N(;(+
 2
u ) 1), under which the market's beliefs are consistent with Bayes' Rule. This over-reaction
eect is always positive, and may be strong enough to cause the volatility of prices to exceed the
volatility of realized dividends. This becomes possible in particular when information frictions in
the market (as measured by the gap between P and V ) are suciently severe.
To conclude, we point out that the same forces that lead to large excess volatility in prices also
generate a low correlation of prices with realized dividends.
Proposition 2 (Low predictability of dividends) Fix P > 0. Then
lim
V !0





The key to this result is to note that the unconditional correlation of prices and realized div-
idends is bounded above by the ratio between the unconditional variances of the expected and
realized dividends V (z) and  (). Likewise, the OLS regression coecient for regressing realized
dividends against prices is bounded by the ratio of the unconditional variances of V (z) and P (z).
When V is suciently low, i.e. when the market signal is very uninformative, then these ratios
are close to zero (i.e. the posterior expectation remains much closer to the prior expectation than
the actual dividend realization, and the posterior expectation is much less volatile than the price).
In this case, the predictability of dividends from prices is very low. This turns out to be precisely
the case in which the information aggregation wedge also has the potential to generate large excess
price volatility.
possible comparison between the actual and the counter-factual variance of prices. This variability measure then
introduces the need to also rank the bias terms, which is done for symmetric, upside or downside risks. Since the bias
terms are likely to be small compared to the variances, similar, but technically less clean results are likely to hold for
arbitrary risks or other variability measures.
20These results oer a new perspective on the well documented \excess volatility puzzle" (Le Roy
and Porter 1981; Shiller 1981), and the low predictability of future dividend growth. As reported
by Shiller (1981) and Le Roy and Porter (1981), the volatility of realized dividends is much lower
than the volatility in prices. In representative agent models with Bayesian updating, the volatility
of expected dividends can never exceed realized dividends (West, 1988), whose importance in
variance decomposition tests is very small.10 Therefore, the literature has focused on variation
in the stochastic discount factor coming from risk aversion as a source of excess price volatility in
economies that allow a representative agent characterization (Campbell and Shiller 1988; Cochrane,
1992).
At the same time, a large body of empirical work in nance suggests that share prices are at
best a very noisy predictor of future growth in dividends. As reviewed in Campbell (2003) (see
references therein), quarterly real dividend growth and real stock returns for US post-war data
have a correlation of only 0.03, which increases to 0.47 at 4-year horizons. This poses another
challenge for risk-based explanations of asset price volatility, because it suggests that most of the
price volatility results from factors that are largely orthogonal to expected future dividends.
Our theory suggests instead that high return volatility could result from volatile dividend ex-
pectations in a Bayesian environment despite low variation in observed dividends, as long as the
informational frictions stressed above are severe enough. When noise trading is highly volatile, mar-
ket information in prices is noisy and traders beliefs remain heterogeneous in equilibrium. With
nite precision of private signals, large shifts in noisy demand are then absorbed by large shifts in
the identity of the marginal trader, resulting in high price volatility. The ratio between price and
realized dividend volatility can be made arbitrarily large by increasing the variance of noise trading
shocks. At the same time, the correlation between prices and realized subsequent dividends can be
arbitrarily close to zero, which is potentially consistent with the evidence summarized by Campbell
(2003). If the price is suciently noisy so as to be a poor signal of fundamentals, yet individual
traders have suciently precise private information, then our model can jointly account for large
excess price volatility, and low predictability of future dividend yields.
Whether heterogeneous expectations can quantitatively account for observed excess price volatil-
ity and low predictability of future dividends is an empirical question we do not address here.
Rather, the contribution of our model in this respect is to oer a theoretical framework, fully con-
sistent with agent rationality, where this channel is not ruled out by the mere observation that the
variability of actual dividends is modest, and not highly correlated with prices.
10For a recent digression, see Chen and Zhao (2009).
214 Applications
In this section, we study two applications of our theory. First, we reconsider the Modigliani-Miller
Theorem. Second, in a dynamic extension of our model we show conditions under which bubbles
arise.
4.1 Splitting Cash-ows to inuence market value
The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that in perfect and complete nancial markets, splitting a
Cash-ow into two dierent securities, and selling these claims separately to investors does not
inuence its total market value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Here we show that with noisy in-
formation aggregation, the Modigliani-Miller theorem remains valid only if the dierent claims are
sold to investor pools with identical informational characteristics. When the investor pools for
dierent claims have dierent characteristics, then the nature of the split inuences the seller's
revenue. The seller in turn can increase her revenues by tailoring the split to the dierent investor
types.
Consider a seller who owns claims on a stochastic dividend  (). This cash ow is divided into
two parts, 1 and 2, both monotone in , such that 1 + 2 = , and then sold to traders in two
separate markets. We assume that 2 has more upside risk than 1. For each claim, there is a unit




























That is, each market is aected by a noise trader shock si with market-specic noise parameter
2
u;i. The environment is then characterized by the market-characteristics i and 2
u;i, and by the
correlation of demand shocks across markets, . Traders are active only in their respective market.
However, we consider both the possibility that traders observe and condition on prices in the other
market (informational linkages), and the possibility that they do not (informational segregation).
Under informational segregation, the analysis of the two markets can be completely separated;
any correlation between the two in prices is the result of correlation in demand shocks, as well as the
common underlying fundamental, but this doesn't inuence expected revenues. The equilibrium
characterization from proposition 1 applies separately in each market:











22The seller's total expected revenue in excess of the cash ow's expected dividend value is then
given by W1 (P;1) + W2 (P;2), where P;i is determined as in lemma 2, and denotes the level of
informational frictions in each market.
With informational linkages, the equilibrium analysis has to be adjusted to incorporate the
information contained in price 1 for the traders in market 2, and vice versa. The characterization
proceeds along the same lines as the previous model. Since expected dividends are monotone,
informed traders in market i will buy a security if and only if their private signal exceeds a threshold
^ xi (), where ^ xi () is conditioned on both prices. By market-clearing, it must be the case that
^ xi () = zi   + 1=
p
i  si. Observing Pi is then isomorphic to observing zi, and observing both
prices is isomorphic to observing (z1;z2). We let (z1;z2) denote the state, and consider equilibrium
price functions P1 () and P2 () that are measurable w.r.t. (z1;z2). It is then straight-forward to
characterize posterior beliefs over  using Bayes'rule, and to characterize the traders' indierence
conditions and hence the market price functions, and expected dividends, conditional on (z1;z2):
P1 (z1;z2) = E(1()jx = z1;z1;z2) and V1 (z1;z2) = E(1()jz1;z2);
P2 (z1;z2) = E(2()jx = z2;z1;z2) and V2 (z1;z2) = E(2()jz1;z2)
In Appendix B we fully characterize expected prices and dividends for this two asset model. In
particular, we show the following modied version of lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (Unconditional Wedge with two assets) For each cash-ow i, the unconditional
















































Therefore, the cases of informational segregation and informational linkages only dier in terms
of how our measure of informational frictions P;i depends on the underlying primitive parameters in
each case, but for given values of i and P;i, the seller's expected revenue net of expected dividends
in both cases is W1 (P;1) + W2 (P;2). We can now state a rst version of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem for expected revenues in our model.
Proposition 3 (Modigliani-Miller I) (i) The cash-ow split does not aect the seller's expected
revenue, if and only if the market characteristics are identical: P;1 = P;2.
(ii) If P;1 > P;2, W1 (P;1) + W2 (P;2) > W1 (P;2) + W2 (P;1), while if P;1 < P;2,
W1 (P;1) + W2 (P;2) < W1 (P;2) + W2 (P;1).
23The key to this proposition is that, for given values of P, the expected information aggregation
wedge is additive across cash ows: W1 (P) + W2 (P) = W1+2 (P), for any P, 1 and 2.
If the two markets have identical characteristics, i.e. P;1 = P;2, only the combined cash ow
matters for the total wedge - i.e. the Modigliani-Miller result applies. If on the other hand the
two markets have dierent informational characteristics, then the increasing dierence property of
W1 () implies that the seller's revenue is inuenced by how the two cash ows are matched to
the two markets, and the revenue is higher when the upside risk is matched with the market that
has more severe information frictions (a higher value of P). Intuitively, the seller exploits the
information aggregation wedge to manipulate revenues, matching the pool of investors with high
informational frictions with the upside risk, while selling the downside risks to an investor pool
with lower informational frictions. This maximizes the gains from the positive wedge resulting on
the upside, while it minimizes the losses from the negative wedge on the downside. This logic is
pushed further by the next proposition, which considers how the seller can exploit the heterogeneity
in investor pools if she gets to design the split of  into 1 and 2.
Proposition 4 (Designing Cash ows) The seller maximizes her expected revenues by splitting
cash ows according to 
1 () = minf (); (0)g and 
2 () = maxf ()    (0);0g, and then
assigning 
1 to the investor pool with the lower value of P.
Figure 4 sketches the optimal dividend split for an arbitrary dividend function. The seller
maximizes the total proceeds by assigning all the cash ow below the line dened by (:) = (0)
to the investor group with the lowest information friction parameter; P;1, and the complement
to the investor group with the highest friction; P;2. It is easy to show that any other arbitrary
division of cash ows f1();2()g implies that both 0
1 ()   0
1 ( )  0
1 ()   0
1 ( ), and
0
2 ()   0
2 ( )  0
2 ()   0
2 ( ). That is, 1 has less downside risk than 
1, and 2 has less
upside risk than 
2. The increasing dierence property of part iv) in Theorem 1 then implies that
any transfer of cash ows between investor groups resulting from the alternative split reduces the
total proceeds of the issuance. Intuitively, the optimal split loads the entire downside risk on the
investor group that discounts the price of the claim the least with respect to its expected payo
(because of the low friction parameter; P;1), while loading the entire upside risk to the group that
overvalues the claim the most with respect to its expected dividend (due to the high information
frictions; P;2). When  () > 0, this split has a straight-forward interpretation in terms of debt
and equity, with a default point on debt that is set at the prior mean  = 0.
An important limitation of the discussion in this section is that we take as given the dierences
24Figure 4: Optimal Cash-ow Design
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in market characteristics. Moreover, we are implicitly assuming that, given these dierences, the
seller can freely assign the cash-ows to these two pools. In practice the situation is of course more
complicated, because the investor's incentives to obtain information also depends on the asset risks
they face. Analyzing this interplay between investor's information choices and the resulting market
characteristics, along with the seller's security design question is clearly beyond the scope of this
paper, but an important avenue for further work. The results here are simply intended to highlight
the possibility of systematic departures from Modigliani and Miller's (1958) irrelevance result, and
show that the information frictions give the owner of a cash ow distinct possibility to manipulate
its market value through strategic security design.
We conclude this section by stating a second version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for realized
revenues, P1 (z1;z2)+P2 (z1;z2). The original Modigliani-Miller theorem holds also at an interim
25stage conditional on new information, as long as the marginal traders in the two markets hold
identical beliefs for each realization (z1;z2).
Proposition 5 (Modigliani-Miller II) (i) With informational segregation: P1 (z1;z2)+P2 (z1;z2) =
P (z1;z2) almost surely, if and only if the noise trading is perfectly correlated across markets
( = 1), and the two markets have identical informational characteristics (1 = 2 and 2
u;1 = 2
u;2).
(ii) With informational linkages P1 (z1;z2) + P2 (z1;z2) = P (z1;z2) almost surely, if and






The perfect correlation reduces the noise to a single common shock. That this is necessary for the
theorem to hold under segregation is immediate. It is also necessary for the case with informational
linkages, because of the dierent weighting between the signals for the marginal traders in the two
markets. In addition the signal distributions need to be the same, requiring that 1 = 2 and 2
u;1 =
2
u;2. Finally, the wedge needs to be the same in the two markets, or P;1 = P;2. Together these
conditions imply that the two markets have identical informational characteristics, and the marginal
trader therefore holds identical beliefs. In the case with informational linkages, we need to consider
the additional possibility that when 1 2
u;1 6= 2 2
u;2 and  = 1, the observations of two signals with
dierent precision but perfectly correlated noise enables every trader to perfectly infer  and u from
the two prices regardless of the informational parameters, hence P1 (z1;z2) + P2 (z1;z2) = ().
An interim version of the theorem therefore requires perfect correlation in the noise in dierent
markets, on top of identical informational characteristics.
4.2 Dynamic Trading and Bubbles
As our second application, we consider a simple dynamic extension of our basic model, and show
by means of an example how it can easily result in persistent (or even permanent) over-valuation
of securities. Standard arguments imply that no arbitrage and common information rules out the
possibility of rational bubbles for a general class of dynamic asset market economies (Tirole, 1982;
Santos and Woodford, 1997). This is one of the classic no-arbitrage results: while a buy-and-
hold strategy insures that a security can never be worth less than its fundamental value under
no-arbitrage, a positive bubble component in the price is consistent with arbitrage by buy-and-sell
strategies only if its date zero present value follows a Martingale process. But this is inconsistent
with the implication of discounting and the transversality condition, that aggregate wealth and
26the present discounted value of aggregate consumption has nite present value - unless the bubble
component is exactly zero.
Here, we show in a simple dynamic example how heterogeneous information and our limits to
arbitrage break exactly this result. It is still true that the anticipation of a higher price in the future
leads traders to bid up the price in the current period. In our environment, however, extending
the insights of Theorem 1 to a dynamic environment, we show that a positive wedge (on average)
is sustainable in the future, and leads to a higher willingness to pay in the current period. If
this anticipation of a positive future wedge is suciently strong it can more than oset a negative
contribution of current payos to the wedge, implying that the security is priced above the present
discounted value of future dividends in all periods and states.
We establish this result in a model in which per period cashows  () are i.i.d. over time, and
the security is innitely lived. As conditions, we require that  () is dominated by upside risks, so
that on average it is expected to trade at a premium, and bounded below (non-negative), so that
there is a bound on the wedge on the downside. Inverting the conditions, we also obtain that a
security that is dominated by downside risks and has a uniform bound on the upside may trade
permanently at a discount.
Time is discrete and innite, and in each period a new trading round takes place, with informed
traders and noise traders. As before the total asset supply is 1. The asset pays dividends  (t)
after the current trading round has taken place (hence t is publicly known before the start of
period t + 1). For simplicity we assume that the fundamental t and the stochastic demand shock
ut are distributed as specied as in section 2, and i.i.d. over time.11 Traders are long-lived and
risk-neutral and discount the future at a rate  2 (0;1).
The lack of persistence in the dividend process implies that trading in round t only aggregates
information about the current fundamental, but includes the anticipation of future prices. Formally,
the payo to a share bought in period t is  (t) + P (zt+1), where P (zt+1) is the price in period
t + 1, contingent on the period t + 1 state zt+1. The price then satises the following recursive
characterization:
P (zt) = E( (t) + P (zt+1)jx = zt;zt); (10)
and the expected dividend value of the asset satises:
V (zt) = E( (t) + V (zt+1)jzt): (11)
11It is possible but outside the scope of the current paper to extend the analysis to allow for persistent fundamental
processes. The i.i.d. case is sucient to convey the core insights that anticipated future wedges inuence the current
level of the wedge.
27Using the fact that in the i.i.d. case, the expected future prices and dividend values correspond
to the unconditional ones, we have the following characterization of the information aggregation
wedge in the dynamic model:
W (zt) = w (zt) + E(W (z)) = w (zt) +

1   
E(w (z)), where (12)
w (zt) = E( (t)jx = zt;zt)   E( (t)jzt)
is the wedge resulting from the current period payos, and E(w (z)) its corresponding uncondi-
tional expectation. Thus, the information aggregation wedge in the dynamic setting depends on
both the wedge resulting from current payos, and the expected discounted future wedge. Even
when the current wedge is negative (at low realizations of z), the overall wedge may still be positive
because traders anticipate higher share prices in the future. The following proposition formalizes
this observation.
Proposition 6 (Sustainability of Bubbles) Suppose that  () is bounded below, increasing,
and convex. Then, for any P > , there exists ^  < 1 such that for all  > ^ , W (z) > 0,
for all z.
Proposition 6 shows how claims that have a lower bound on payos (for example, requiring them
to be non-negative), and that generate a positive unconditional wedge, can be priced in the market
at a value exceeding expected dividends at all times and in all states of the world. Symmetrically,
a claim whose payos are bounded above may be undervalued in all future states. The positive
(negative) exponential payo function from example 1 exactly satises the required conditions for
a permanent bubble (or discount).
The example illustrates the key forces that are at play to overturn the no-arbitrage argument
against bubbles: First, with mean reversion in fundamentals and noise trading (captured by the i.i.d.
assumption in shocks), the traders anticipation of future wedges are driven by the unconditional
wedge. With upside risks, this is positive. Second, with bounded payos, there is a limit to how
much the market's expectation of current dividends can be undervalued relative to the objective
outsider's expectation. Third, the anticipation of a positive future wedge will dominate a negative
current wedge, if traders are suciently patient.
This example is of course highly stylized, as a complete and exhaustive discussion of dynamic
extensions of our model leads to additional diculties on its own, which exceed the scope of
this paper, and are left to future work. Nevertheless it is suggestive of the types of markets in
which information-driven bubbles are likely to emerge, and when they are likely to occur, namely
28those that represent signicant future upside opportunities, and/or markets in which investors face
implicit protection against downside risks. Furthermore, such bubbles are more likely to occur in
time periods where real interest rates are low.
5 Discussion
In this section, we explore the robustness of the information aggregation wedge to changes in
the model's core assumptions. We show that the information aggregation wedge is (i) robust to
alternative specications of the prior distribution of , alternative distributions of private signals,
and arbitrary specications of the position limits, and (ii) inversely related to the extent of arbitrage
activity by risk-neutral, uninformed traders (or more specically the demand elasticity of noise and
uninformed traders).
5.1 Distributional assumptions and limits to arbitrage
First, we generalize the distributional assumptions and arbitrage limits. Specically, suppose as be-
fore that traders are risk-neutral, but consider now the following generalization: (i)  is distributed
according to an arbitrary smooth prior h() on R, (ii) private signals are distributed i.i.d. according
to a distribution with cdf F (j), which satises the monotone likelihood ratio property, (iii) posi-
tion limits are arbitrary nite numbers [dL;dH], and (iv) the noise trader demand D is distributed
according to an arbitrary smooth distribution with cdf G() on [1   dH;1   dL]. This formulation
imposes few restrictions on the distributions apart from the monotone likelihood ratio property
for private signals (to insure monotonicity of posteriors and trading behavior), and smoothness as-
sumptions to maintain continuity and invertibility of the price function. The following equilibrium
characterization is then a direct generalization of proposition 1:
Proposition 7 (Distributional Assumptions and arbitrage limits) In the unique asset mar-
ket equilibrium, the price function P (z) is characterized by
P(z) = E(()jx = z;z) =
R
()h()e g (F (zj))f2 (zj)d R
h()e g (F (zj))f2 (zj)d
; (13)
and the traders' threshold function is ^ x(p) = z = P 1 (p). The expected dividend conditional on z
takes the form
V (z) = E(()jz) =
R
()h()e g (F (zj))f (zj)d R
h()e g (F (zj))f (zj)d
, (14)
where e g (D) = (dH   dL)g (1   dH + (dH   dL)D).
29Risk-neutrality, position limits and the MLRP on private signals allow us to retain a threshold
characterization for the buying strategy of informed traders. We can then use the market-clearing
condition to redene the information conveyed through P by an observable state variable z = ^ x(P),
whose realization depends only on the exogenous shocks  and D. The indierence condition for
the marginal trader implies that P (z) = E(()jx = z;z). That is, the asset price equal the
expectation of an informed trader with public signal z and an independent private signal x whose
realization also equals z. The expected dividend, on the other hand, conditions on z only once as
the market signal. The nal step in the proof consists in characterizing the distribution of z from
the primitive distributions, and showing that its conditional pdf is '(zj) = e g (F (zj))f (zj) =
(dH   dL)g (1   dH + (dH   dL)F (zj))f (zj).
This characterization shows that the logic of the wedge is not directly tied to the specic
distributional assumptions that we have made (other than the MLRP assumption on signals). It also
shows that the position bounds to [dL;dH] = [0;1] amount to nothing more than a re-normalization
of the noise-trading distribution, such that a wider band in positions (as measured by a higher value
of dH   dL) is equivalent to a reduction of the variance in supply shocks. In other words, a model
with arbitrary position bounds [dL;dH] and a given distribution G() of supply shocks is equivalent
in terms of prices to a model with position bounds normalized to [0;1] along with a normalized
distribution of supply shocks given by e G(), where e G(D0) = G(1   dH + (dH   dL)D0).
5.2 Price impact of information
We now generalize our previous formulation to allow for a response of uninformed traders to per-
ceived excess returns on the asset, as well as stochastic trading motives which are unrelated to
dividend expectations (for example, liquidity or hedging needs). We keep the same model as in
section 2, but consider the following formulation for asset demand:
D(u;P) = (u +  (E( ()jP)   P)), (15)





. Uninformed traders' demand is increasing in the expected return conditional
on the price, E( ()jP)   P, with an elasticity given by .12 The parameter  captures the
responsiveness of uninformed traders to the expectation of dividends in excess of prices, or in other
words, the extent to which they are willing or able to arbitrage away the dierence between expected
12Exactly the same analysis can be conducted if uninformed traders responded to the expected return E( ()jP)=P
(provided the latter is well-dened, i.e.  () is always non-negative), instead of the payo dierence E( ()jP) P.
30price and dividend value. Equivalently,  measures the price impact of private information which
relates naturally to the concept of market liquidity.
We follow our previous equilibrium characterization and asset prices with minor changes to ac-
count for the endogeneity of demand to asset prices. Market-clearing implies 
 p
 (^ x(P)   )

=
(u +  (E( ()jP)   P)), or




u = ^ x(P)   =
p
  (E( ()jP)   P). (16)





, and Lemma 1 continues to hold
without any changes. Using the fact that the expected dividend is E( ()jP) = E( ()jz) =
V (z), the equilibrium price function is implicitly dened by the marginal trader's indierence
condition
P (z) = E( ()j^ x(P);z) = E

 ()jz + =
p
  (V (z)   P (z));z

. (17)
This condition implicitly denes the equilibrium price. Let P (z;) denote the equilibrium price
as a function of the elasticity parameter , and P (z;0) = P (z) the price function with inelastic
supply. The next proposition shows that the magnitude of the information aggregation wedge is
inversely related to the uninformed trader's demand elasticity.
Proposition 8 (Price-elastic demand) If P (z;0) = V (z), then P (z;) = V (z), for all . If
P (z;0) 6= V (z), then jP (z;)   V (z)j is strictly decreasing in  and lim!1 jP (z;)   V (z)j = 0.
Therefore, the more elastically the uninformed and noise traders respond to the wedge between
prices and expected dividends, the more they arbitrage away this dierence, and the smaller the
information aggregation wedge becomes. This is illustrated by gure 5, which illustrates (in com-
parison to gure 1) how the price impact of a shift in  is muted by the price elasticity of uninformed
traders.
The wedge results from the informed traders' impact on equilibrium prices. The more traders
move prices by acting on their private information, the larger is the wedge. In the inelastic case,
the wedge was maximized as the informed traders fully determined prices. In the other extreme,
their price impact vanishes in the limit as  ! 1 and the uninformed traders completely arbitrage
the wedge. The parameter  can thus also be intuitively interpreted as a measure of the limits to
arbitrage by uninformed, risk neutral outsiders.
We can illustrate these eects simply in the example with linear dividends:  () = . In this
case, the expected dividend value is V (z) = V  z, as before. The price however solves





 (1   P)
(V (z)   P (z)) =











31Figure 5: Identity Shift with Elastic Supply
Compared to the case with inelastic demand, the over-reaction is smaller, i.e. the coecient in
front of z is decreasing in , and converges to 1 as  ! 1. The wedge
W (z) = (P   V )
2
 (1   P)
2




is also decreasing in  and vanishes as  ! 1. The information aggregation wedge is therefore
largest when uninformed traders are not actively arbitraging the expected return dierence coming
from the information aggregation wedge.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a theory of asset price formation based on heterogeneous infor-
mation and limits to arbitrage. This theory ties expected asset returns to properties of their risk
prole, and generates a channel for excess price volatility. The theory is parsimonious, in the sense
that all its results follow directly from the interplay between heterogeneous information and limits
to arbitrage. The theory is general, in the sense that we do not impose any strong restrictions on
the distribution of asset payos for the purpose of tractability (although we do impose such restric-
tions on information, risk preferences and noise-trading assumptions), but rather aim to identify
the relevant underlying features of cash ows at a general level. And the theory is tractable and
lends itself easily to applications, as suggested by our discussion of the Modigliani-Miller theorem
and the sustainability of bubbles.
32We conclude with short remarks on future potential research directions and our related research.
An important avenue for future work is to merge our model with risk-based asset pricing models. In
Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011a) we provide a rst step in this direction to study information
aggregation wedge in a CARA-normal setup. We show that the main intuition and results extend in
the case where (as is common in CARA models) dividends are symmetrically normally distributed.
A second direction, also explored in one-going related research (Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski,
2011b), is to incorporate the release of public news and disclosures into our asset pricing model,
and explore both positive and normative implications of public information and disclosure rules for
asset prices. A third important extension is to extend the analysis of a multi-period, and multi-asset
extensions of our market model, both of which have already been touched upon in this paper in the
context of specic examples. A nal important direction lies in the integration of nancial market
frictions with real decisions that endogenize the dividend payo function we considered here. In a
companion paper (Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2011c), we consider one such model in which
there is interplay between information aggregation, rm decisions and managerial incentives in a
simple model of informational feedback.
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357 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i): By market-clearing, z =^ x(P (z)) and ^ x(P (z0)) = z0, and therefore
z = z0 if and only if P (z) = P (z0).
Part (ii): Since P (z) is invertible, observing P is equivalent to observing z =^ x(P (z)) in equi-





, from which the characterization of H (jx;P) follows immediately
from Bayes' Law.
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting ^ x(P) = z, a price function P (z) is part of an equilibrium if
and only if it satises (6) and is invertible.  () is strictly increasing, and an increase in z represents
a rst-order stochastic shift in the posterior over , so the price function P (z) is continuous and
monotone over its domain and spans its entire range, hence invertible. Moreover, all prices are
observed in equilibrium (and hence out-of-equilibrium beliefs play no role). Thus, P (z) denes
the unique equilibrium in which prices are conditioned only on z.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the law of iterated expectations, E(V (z)) = E( ()) =
R 1
 1  ()d(=).
To nd E(P (z)), dene 2
P = 2



































































































































where the rst equality proceeds by integration by parts, the second by a change in variables, and
the third step uses the symmetry of the normal distribution (( x) = 1   (x)).
36Proof of Theorem 1. Parts (i) (iii) follow immediately from lemma 2, the denition of upside
and downside risk, and the fact that (=) > (=P) for all  (since P > ). For part (iv)
notice that
















where () = 0
1 ()   0
1 ( )   (0
2 ()   0
2 ( )).
Since 1 is has more upside risk than 2, ()  0 for all , which implies that W1 (P) W2 (P)
is increasing in P.
Proof of Theorem 2. Part (i): To compare the volatility of prices with that of expected
dividends, we write E







(P (z)   P (0))







(P (b z)   P (0))





(P (z)   P (0))
2 jb z  N(;( +  2
u ) 1)

where we have just made explicit the distribution of z conditional on , and we have added
and subtracted the term E

(P (b z)   P (0))
2 jb z  N(;( +  2
u ) 1)

. This term evaluates the
variability of prices under a counter-factual distribution of the signal, such that P (b z) can be
interpreted as a posterior expectation of  conditional on b z. The various comparisons are now
based on (i) evaluating the dierence in the rst line, which we will label the amplication term,
and (ii) comparing E

(P (b z)   P (0))















For the amplication term, we have
E

(P (z)   P (0))
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, while for z < 0, both the inequalities
are reversed. It follows immediately that this integral is always positive.
37For the second part, we rst break down the three terms into a variance and a bias component:
E

( ()    (0))
2





(V (z)   V (0))
2





(P (b z)   P (0))

















Now, the functions  (), V () P () are all equal to E( ()js), for dierent specications





for V (), and sj 
N(;( +  2






a mean-preserving spread over N(;(+ 2
u ) 1), which is a mean-preserving spread over sj = .
It follows immediately from Blackwell (1951) that
V ar( ()) > V ar
 
P (b z)jb z  N(;( +  2
u ) 1)

> V ar(V (z)).
Moreover, E( ()) = E(V (z)) = E
 
P (b z)jb z  N(;( +  2
u ) 1)

, by the Law of Iterated



































Applying this formula to P (0) with  = P, to V (0) with  = V , to E( ()) with  =
0, we nd that for upside risks, E( ()) > V (0) > P (0) >  (0), while for downside risks,
E( ()) < V (0) < P (0) <  (0). In both cases, (E( ())    (0))
2 > (E( ())   P (0))
2 >
(E( ())   V (0))
2, which completes the proof for part (i).
Part (ii) Follows immediately from observing that these comparative statics apply separately
to each of the terms used in the decomposition in part (i).
Part (iii) Fixing V < 1, if P ! 1 the variance and bias terms for P approach those for  ().
We thus wish to show merely that the amplication term doesn't vanish. But this term converges
to Z
2P0













Likewise, xing P < 1, as V ! 0, the bias and variance terms are xed, and we therefore consider
38the amplication term, which converges to
Z
2P0

























(P (z)   P (0))








which is strictly positive, and innite whenever P () (or equivalently  ()) is unbounded on at
least one side (part iv).
Proof of Proposition 2. The covariance of P (z) with  () satises
jcov (P (z); ())j = jE((P (z)   E(P (z)))( ()   E( ())))j
= jE((P (z)   E(P (z)))(V (z)   E(V (z))))j 
p
V ar(P (z))V ar(V (z)).
Therefore the correlation of P (z) with  () satises
jcorr(P (z); ())j =
jcov (P (z); ())j
p






and the regression beta of  () against P (z) satises







The result then follows from observing that, for given 2
, limV !0 V ar(V (z)) = 0, while V ar( ())
remains constant and V ar(P (z)) is bounded away from 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. We focus on market 1; the characterization is identical for market 2. The































































where 1 = 1=2
u;1 and 2 = 2=2













































1 + 2   2
p
12
1   2 .





is the traders' private signal distribution, then jx;z1;z2  N





where ^ (x;z1;z2) = (1x + V (z1;z2))=(1 + V ). Therefore,
^ (x = z1;z1;z2) = (1 + V )
 1  







where 0 = (1;0). This fully characterizes the price and expected dividend functions P (z1;z2) =








1 = (1 + V )
 1  
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1 + V )
 1




































(1 + V )
2,
Therefore, we compute 2
P;1 as 2












(1 + V )













The proof is completed by substituting for 1 and 2 in the denition of V .
Proof of Proposition 3. If P;1 = P;2 = P, then W1 (P;1)+W2 (P;2) = W (P), and hence
the total expected revenue is not aected by the split. If instead P;1 6= P;2, then by Theorem 1,
W1 (P;1)+W2 (P;2) > W1 (P;2)+W2 (P;1), whenever P;2 > P;1 (since 2 has more upside
risk than 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. For any alternative split (1;2), the monotonicity requirements imply
that 0  0
1 () = 0 () 0
2 ()  0 (). This in turn implies that for all   0, 0
1 () 0
1 ( ) =
 0 ( )  0
1 ()   0
1 ( ) and 0
2 ()   0
2 ( ) = 0 ()  0
2 ()   0
2 ( ), i.e. 1 has less
downside risk and more upside risk than 











2 ()   0
2 ( )

= 0 () 0 ( ) =
 
0






2 ()   0
2 ( )

40But then, the expected revenue of selling 1 to the investor pool with P;1 and 2 to the investor
pool with P;2 is W1 (P;1)+W2 (P;2) = W (P;1)+W2 (P;2) W2 (P;1), while the expected
revenue from selling 
1 to the investor pool with P;1 and 
2 to the investor pool with P;2 is
W
1 (P;1)+W
2 (P;2) = W (P;1)+W
2 (P;2) W
2 (P;1). The dierence in revenues is therefore
W
2 (P;2) W
2 (P;1) (W2 (P;2)   W2 (P;1)), which is positive, since 
2 contains more upside
and less downside risk than 2, and P;2  P;1 (Theorem 1, part (iv)).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Clearly, z1 = z2 = z almost surely if and only if  = 1. If 1 = 2 and 2
u;1 = 2
u;2, it then
follows that P1 (z1;z2) + P2 (z1;z2) = P (z), almost surely, if and only if  = 1. Moreover,
it follows from the characterizations of P1 and P2 that the price function is no longer additive
(even if  = 1), whenever 1 6= 2 or 2
u;1 6= 2
u;2, unless the markets are informationally linked,
and 1 2
u;1 6= 22
u;2. In this last case, we nd that signals have dierent precision, but perfectly
correlated errors, so  and the correlated error can be perfectly inferred from the two signals, i.e.
V ! 1 in the characterization in lemma 3, and the wedge disappears.
Proof of Proposition 6. If  () is convex, then by Theorem 1, for any nite w, there exists
^  < 1, s.t.  > ^ , E(w(z)) >  (1   )w. We therefore need to establish a lower bound for w(z).
But if  () is bounded below, then limz! 1 w(z) = 0, and w(z) is positive for suciently high z,
so it is necessarily bounded.
Proof of Proposition 7. Risk-neutrality, position limits, and the MLRP on private signals
jointly imply that E(()jx;P) is monotone in x, and the informed demand is characterized
by a private signal threshold ^ x(P) which satises the same indierence condition as (2), with
the posterior H (jx;P) to be determined. Market-clearing then implies that dLF (^ x(P)j) +
dH (1   F (^ x(P)j)) + D = 1, or
F (^ x(P)j) =
D   (1   dH)
dH   dL
.
Since the LHS is increasing in ^ x(P) and decreasing in , and the RHS is increasing in D, we can
dene the endogenous market signal by z = ^ x(P) which is informationally equivalent to observing
P. But then, this implies that equilibrium prices take the form























41It follows immediately that '(zj) = (dH   dL)g (1   dH + (dH   dL)F (z0j))f (zj).
Proof of Proposition 8.
If P (z;0) = V (z), then P (z;) = V (z) solves the pricing equation for any  > 0. If P (z;0) 6=
V (z), then dene the function T  (P;z) as
T  (P;z) = E

 ()jz + =
p
  (V (z)   P);z

.
T  (P;z) is continuous and decreasing in P, and T  (V (z);z) = P (z;0). Moreover, if V (z) >
P (z;0), then T  (P (z;0);z) > P (z;0), T  (V (z);z) < V (z), and therefore there exists a unique
P (z;) 2 (P (z;0);V (z)), such that T  (P (z;);z) = P (z;). If instead V (z) < P (z;0), then
T  (P (z;0);z) < P (z;0), T  (V (z);z) > V (z), and T  (P (z;);z) = P (z;) for a unique
P (z;) 2 (V (z);P (z;0)). Moreover, replacing P (z;0) with P (z;0) for 0 <  in the steps
above shows that jP (z;)   V (z)j is strictly decreasing in . For the limit, notice that since
P (z;) is monotone in  and bounded, it must converge to a limit P (z;1) = lim!1 P (z;).
If P (z;1) > V (z), then P (z;1) = lim!1 T  (P (z;);z) =  1, whereas if P (z;1) < V (z),
then P (z;1) = lim!1 T  (P (z;);z) = 1., both of which are contradictions. Therefore, we are
left with P (z;1) = V (z) at the limit.
42